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Administrative Regulation of the High School Press 
You are a high school student with a complaint about the election 
procedures for student government. You know the student newspaper 
refuses to print such controversial material, so you decide to distribute 
a handbill in the halls. But first, ever prudent, you check your copy of 
the Code of Student Regulations.- Buried amidst the fine print is the 
following section: 
No person shall distribute any printed or written matter on the grounds 
of any school or in any school building unless the distribution of such 
material shall have prior approval by the school administration. In 
granting or denying approval, the following guidelines shall apply. No 
material shall be distributed which, either by its content or by the man-
ner of distribution itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly opera-
tion and discipline of the school, will cause violence or disorder, or will 
constitute an invasion of the rights of others. 1 
The regulation mandates swift review of material submitted for ap-
proval and permits appeal to the Board of Education. Another section 
of the regulations authorizes the school administration to suspend stu-
dents who violate the rules. 
You read the regulation with dismay. The criteria look vague 
enough to justify denying approval to almost anything, and the only 
appeal is to the principal's bosses. But without prior administrative 
approval you could be suspended for making your point. Finally you 
submit your handbill to the principal for review; he denies permission 
to distribute the handbill on school property, saying that your criti-
cism will undermine authority, hamper discipline, and interfere with 
the orderly operation of the school and its elections. The principal 
reminds you that you can appeal his decision, but not until the next 
monthly meeting of the Board of Education. 2 The election will have 
passed by then, so you regretfully tear up your diatribe and resign 
yourself to suffering in silence. 
This Note examines the constitutional limits on administrative reg-
. ulation of publications by and for public high school students. 3 Part I 
1. This language is quoted from the regulation challenged in Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of 
Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1971). Eisner upheld the regulation against challenges for 
vagueness and overbreadth, despite reservations about the exact language used. 440 F.2d at 808-
09. 
2. Long delays are tolerated in evaluating the suppression of student speech. Compare 
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding suppression ofa student-compiled 
sexual-attitudes questionnaire until after a 12-week administrative appeals process), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 925 (1978), with New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting 
government claim of irreparable damage to national security as insufficient to justify a restraint 
on publication of classified documents; articles appeared June 12-18, 1971; district court and 
court of appeals review completed by June 23; Supreme Court opinion issued on June 30). 
3. This Note does not address the right of private schools to regulate student publications. In 
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discusses the widely divergent standards adopted by different circuits. 
Part II describes the hard line the Supreme Court has taken against 
restraints on free expression in the adult context and the different cir-
cumstances that justify limiting freedom of expression in high schools. 
Part III discusses the timing of administrative regulation of student 
speech. This Part argues that prior restraint is constitutionally accept-
able and, in fact, preferable to subsequent punishment so long as its 
use is governed by proper criteria. Part IV analyzes the justifications 
advanced by schools to support the regulation of student publications, 
concluding that the Supreme Court's guidelines must be read strictly 
to minimize encroachment on students' first amendment rights. Part 
V describes the need for judicial review of suppression of student 
speech, but concludes that the student should have the burden of chal-
lenging the regulation by filing suit. 
I. STATUS OF AUTHORITY 
The starting point for any discussion of the first amendment rights 
of high school students is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District. 4 In Tinker, the Supreme Court for the first time 
squarely recognized students' right to freedom of expression in the 
schools.5 The Court, however, went on to add: 
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially dis-
rupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights 
of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech. 6 
Because courts have found a compelling state interest in ensuring or-
derly schools, they have permitted regulation of some student speech7 
that in the adult context would be inviolable. 8 
Since promulgating these standards in 1969, the Supreme Court 
has refused to apply them to other student speech cases. Five cases 
raising the issue of high school students' first amendment rights have 
been brought to the Court on petitions for certiorari: four times the 
writ has been denied, 9 and the Court dismissed the fifth case as moot 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the actions of a pri-
vate school that received over 90% of its funds from the state were not covered by the state-
action doctrine, under which the first amendment is applied to the states via the fourteenth 
amendment. The opinion emphasized that a state function is one reserved exclusively to the 
state, whereas education has traditionally been shared by the public and private sectors. 
4. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
5. 393 U.S. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their con-
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."). 
6. 393 U.S. at 513. 
7. See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966). 
8. See notes 23-35 infra and accompanying text. 
9. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (forbidding school from disci-
plining students for off-campus distribution of a satire on student life), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 
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after learning at oral argument that the plaintiff had graduated from 
high school. 10 Each circuit has thus been left to its own interpretation 
of the Tinker standard, the result being inconsistency both within a 
given circuit11 and among the circuits. 
The Seventh Circuit has taken the hardest line against administra-
tive restrictions on the high school press. In reversing the suspension 
of students for distributing an unapproved underground newspaper in 
school, the court stated: "Tinker . . . is properly a formula for deter-
mining when the requirements of school discipline justify punishment 
of students for exercise of their First-Amendment rights. It is not a 
basis for establishing a system of censorship and licensing designed to 
prevent the exercise of First-Amendment rights." 12 However, the 
court went on to assert that school officials may establish "reasonable, 
specific regulations setting forth the time, manner and place in which 
distribution of written materials may occur,"13 and may punish stu-
dents who violate these rules or who distribute obscene or libelous 
literature. 14 
The Second Circuit has given high school officials much more 
power over the content of student publications. It reads Tinker as per-
mitting prior review of material distributed in schools15 and defers 
(1980); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (permitting school's prohibition of 
student-sponsored survey of student sexual attitudes and experiences when school psychologists 
feared harm to some students), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Sullivan v. Houston lndep. 
School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.) (allowing school to suspend a student for distribution of 
unapproved material adjacent to school property - student's failure to comply with prior-sub-
mission procedure sufficient for discipline without reaching the constitutionality of the underly-
ing rules), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.) 
(enjoining discipline of a student for distribution of unapproved material on school premises 
when the discipline was based on the content of the material and not the mode of distribution), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970). 
10. Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973) (preventing school 
from forbidding on-campus distribution of an underground newspaper containing vulgar - but 
not legally obscene - language), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 929 (1974), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 
128 (1975). 
11. Compare Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) (voiding guidelines for 
failure to define "substantial disruption"), with Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th 
Cir. 1980) (upholding a regulation banning an undefined class of "material which encourages 
actions which endanger the health and safety of students"); compare Fujishima v. Board of 
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972) (a school district's requiring prior approval of student 
expression held unconstitutional), with Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805 (2d 
Cir. 1971) ("responsible and fair regulations" for prior submission held not always unconstitu-
tional). For a more comprehensive overview of the split in authority, see Huffman & Trauth, 
High School Students' Publication Rights and Prior Restraint, 10 J. L. & Eouc. 485 (1981). 
12. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972) (emphasis in original). 
13. 460 F.2d at 1359. See notes 145-49 infra and accompanying text. 
14. 460 F.2d at 1359. 
15. In invalidating a school prior-submission rule as procedurally unsound although substan-
tively adequate, the court stated, "We do not agree ... that reasonable and fair regulations 
which ... required prior submission of material for approval, would in all circumstances be an 
unconstitutional 'prior restraint.' " Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
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greatly to the judgment of school authorities in determining what can 
be suppressed. 16 Schools in the Second Circuit may decide for them-
selves what constitutes a disruption, and the courts will not intervene 
except in extreme cases: "It is to everyone's advantage that decisions 
with respect to the operation of local schools be made by local 
officials." 17 
The other circuits that have addressed this issue have taken an in-
termediate position. Most of these cases have arisen in the Fourth 
Circuit, which treats administrative prior restraints as presumptively 
unconstitutional18 but has permitted them when the standards to be 
applied are clear and understandable, 19 and students are provided a 
prompt and adequate appeals procedure.20 The First, Fifth, and 
Ninth Circuits have generally accepted the Fourth Circuit's intermedi-
ate position, 21 permitting prior submission rules but scrutinizing the 
judgment of school officials more closely than does the Second 
16. Trachtman v. Anker, 5,63 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[A] federal court ought not to 
impose its own views in such matters where there is a rational basis for the decisions and actions 
of the school authorities."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). 
17. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971). 
18. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1973) (invalidating 
school prior-submission rule for vagueness, overbreadth, and failure to provide a prompt review 
and appeals procedure). 
19. In Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1973), the court con-
cluded that a definition including the terms "libelous" and "obscene" was not precise or under-
standable enough for high school students. 
20. In practice, schools have had difficulty establishing standards that meet these criteria. 
See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) (rule drafted to comply with these 
criteria still held vague for failing to define the Supreme Court's substantial-disorder or material-
disruption test more precisely and for defining "libelous" in a manner inconsistent with the con-
stitutional definition). But in Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980), a case involv-
ing efforts to halt distribution after it had begun, the Fourth Circuit upheld a decision prohibiting 
continued on-campus distribution of an underground newspaper containing advertisements for 
drug paraphernalia under a rule prohibiting "material which encourages actions which endanger 
the health and safety of students." 622 F.2d at 1203. This language appears vaguer than Ian· 
guage in a prior submission rule previously rejected by the Fourth Circuit. See note 19 supra. 
The Williams court noted with approval the limited nature of the restriction: no prior restraint 
was involved, the students were given back all confiscated copies the same day and permitted to 
distribute the newspaper anywhere except on campus, and no disciplinary action was taken 
against the students. 622 F.2d at 1207. 
21. Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Writers on a high 
school newspaper do not have an unfettered constitutional right to be free from pre-publication 
review.") (dictum in suit brought by a teacher who alleged he was fired for permitting the school 
newspaper to publish controversial articles); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist. 462 F.2d 
960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) ("(E]fforts at expression by high school students may be subjected to 
prior screening under clear and reasonable regulations .... "); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 
F.2d 148, 149 (!st Cir. 1971) (prior restraint held not per se unconstitutional, but regulation 
prohibiting distribution of advertising or promotional literature on school property without any 
"effort to minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint" held invalid); see also Hernandez v. 
Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Neb. 1977) (permitting prior approval only with appropriate 
safeguards and invalidating school board rules that ban all commercial speech regardless of po-
tential for disruption). 
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Circuit.22 
In sum, the circuits are split on what type of student speech a 
school may constitutionally regulate, whether prior restraints on stu-
dent speech are permissible, and ultimately on what criteria should be 
used to determine when administrative regulation of student speech is 
constitutionally permissible. The remainder of this Note will discuss 
these issues, proposing constitutionally sound criteria and procedures 
for the regulation of student speech. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON REsTRAINTS OF SPEECH 
Before considering the first amendment rights of high school stu-
dents, one must first understand the rules governing similar expression 
by adults. This Part will examine the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments on freedom of expression in the adult context and discuss cir-
cumstances that may permit greater control over the high school 
press. 
A. Adult Speech 
Few types of regulation have been criticized as sharply as prior 
restraints on adult expression. The Supreme Court has declared that 
"prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and 
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,"23 and 
the Court has never upheld a permanent restraint imposed without a 
final legal determination that the expression was unprotected. 24 
Under any circumstances, attempts at prior restraint must overcome a 
22. See Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1971) (requiring the 
school to present facts supporting its fear of substantial disruption). 
23. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
24. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (declaring unconstitutional 
a state statute authorizing prior restraint of allegedly obscene films without final adjudication of 
obscenity); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (voiding order against reporting 
details of a notorious murder until jury impaneled to try the accused killer); New York Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting government claim of irreparable harm to national 
security if classified government documents published, as insufficient to justify a restraint on 
publication); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (voiding an injunc-
tion against distribution of leaflets attacking real estate broker for encouraging whites to move 
from a neighborhood); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (preventing a state commis-
sion from pressuring distributors not to sell material it deemed harmful to minors); Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating state statute allowing injunction against continued 
publication of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper); cf United States v. Pro-
gressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.) (granting injunction against publication of details relating 
to the construction of nuclear weapons as potentially causing irreparable damage to national 
security), reconsidered, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(after the challenged material appeared elsewhere in substantially identical form); Southeastern 
Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (overturning municipality's refusal, based on fears of 
obscenity, to rent an auditorium for a production of the play Hair as an unlawful prior restraint); 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (permitting limited prior restraint pending a judicial 
evaluation of allegedly obscene material); but cf Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) 
(allowing permanent injunction against distribution of books found at trial to be legally obscene). 
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heavy presumption of invalidity.25 
Despite its otherwise rigid stance, the Court has held that certain 
narrowly defined classes of speech are not immunized by the first 
amendment and may be regulated or proscribed. These classes include 
obscene speech26 and speech endangering national security.27 Other 
speech, while not restrainable, may subject the speaker to sanctions. 
This category includes malicious defamatory speech28 and incitement 
to illegal action. 29 An attempt to enlarge the list to include speech 
endangering the right of an accused to a fair trial has been rejected, 
and a majority of the Justices in that case suggested that such a re-
straint may never be constitutional. 30 
Even if the speech in question falls under one of these exceptions to 
the first amendment, a government entity seeking a restraint must fol-
low proper procedure. For example, the courts will not allow admin-
istrative panels to adjudicate cases involving allegedly obscene films, 
even temporarily, unless that panel follows procedures "designed to 
25. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
26. Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957). See note 115 infra and accompanying text. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), 
permits limited prior restraint pending a judicial determination of obscenity, and Kingsley Books 
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), permits permanent injunctive relief against books found legally 
obscene at trial. Because everything not legally obscene is protected speech, and because the line 
is so hazy, Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963), warns that special precautions are 
needed to keep the regulations within constitutional bounds. 
27. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). This standard has been interpreted as 
permitting the prior restraint of information only if "disclosure • . . will surely result in direct, 
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people," New York Times v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring), or if "publication [would) inevitably, 
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of n 
transport already at sea," New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). See also United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis.) (approv-
ing restraint on publication of atomic secrets as analogous to publication of troop movements 
during wartime), reconsidered, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 
1979). 
28. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964). While allegedly defamatory 
statements cannot be enjoined, see, e.g., Oil Conservation Engg. Co. v. Brooks Engg. Co., 52 F.2d 
783, 785-86 (6th Cir. 1931); N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (reporting government 
request to suppress criticism of prosecutors from published version of court opinion), those in-
jured by the defamatory remark may sue in tort for damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP 
TORTS § 568 (1977). Sullivan requires that a public figure seeking damages prove not only that 
the allegedly defamatory statement is false, but also that it was made with "actual malice." 376 
U.S. at 279-80. 
29. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See also note 112 infra and accompanying 
text. 
30. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). "(T)here is grave doubt in my mind 
whether orders with respect to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be justifi· 
able." 427 U.S. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring). "[T)here are compelling reasons for not carv-
ing out a new exception to the rule against prior censorship of publication." 427 U.S. at 594-95 
(Brennan, J., joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment). "I agree that the 
judiciary is capable of protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial without enjoining the press 
from publishing information in the public domain." 427 U.S. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
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obviate the dangers of a censorship system."31 The reviewing panel 
must either approve the work or go to court seeking a restraint. 32 The 
panel has the burden of proof in court, 33 and any restraints imposed 
by the panel prior to judicial review may last only a "specified brief 
period."34 Strict compliance with these procedural safeguards is nec-
essary to prevent the curtailment of constitutionally protected 
expression. 35 
The Supreme Court has twice indicated, however, that expression 
by adults but directed toward minors may sometimes be regulated 
even though the same expression is protected when aimed at adults. 
Both cases involved variable standards for obscenity. In Ginsberg v. 
New York, 36 decided a year before Tinker, the Court upheld a statute 
forbidding the sale of soft-core pornography to minors. While the 
magazines were not obscene for adults, 37 the Court held that a state 
could legally bar their sale to minors, citing the state's interests in pro-
tecting the welfare of minors and in supporting parents' authority to 
keep such publications from their children.38 A decade later, in FCC 
v. Pacifica Foundation, 39 the Court justified banning a vulgar (but not 
obscene) George Carlin monologue from the airwaves by referring, 
31. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the 
exhibitor or distributor. Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger 
that he may well be less responsive than a court - part of an independent branch of govern-
ment - to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression. 
380 U.S. at 57-58 (footnote omitted). See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68-71 (1963). 
32. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
33. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
34. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); see also New York Times 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Bantam 
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
35. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). For example, in Southeastern Promo-
tions, the directors of a municipal auditorium condemned the musical Hair as unfit for their stage 
without ever viewing a performance or reading a script, relying entirely on second-hand reports 
of "obscenity" on stage. 420 U.S. 546, 548 (1975). In Bantam Books, the actions of a review 
board whose purpose was to "educate the public concerning ... [literature] manifestly tending 
to the corruption of the youth" induced distributors to recall copies of the bestselling novel 
Peyton Place, thus preventing adults as well as children from obtaining the novel. 372 U.S. 58, 59 
(1963). 
36. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
37. 390 U.S. at 634. 
38. 390 U.S. at 639-40. The New York statute followed the contemporary definition of ob-
scenity, but evaluated expression in terms of its suitability for minors. 390 U.S. at 646. See 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963); 
Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 
1968 SUP. Cr. REv. 153; cf. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978) (when defining general 
community standards of obscenity, juries may not consider children part of the community). 
39. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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among other reasons, to children's easy access to radio receivers. 40 
Ginsberg has been cited for the proposition that the first amendment 
rights of minors are not coextensive with those of adults, thereby al-
lowing regulation in the student context which would not otherwise be 
permitted.41 
B. Student Speech 
Several school systems have tried to justify restriction of student 
expression by claiming, Tinker notwithstanding, that th~ first amend-
ment does not apply to student expression on school property. Some 
schools have asserted that the school board's ownership of the build-
ing and grounds permits it to control what is distributed on school 
property or that the school retains absolute control over publications 
that receive school funds. The courts have rejected both of these as-
sertions. As the Fourth Circuit stated in a case involving a college 
newspaper: 
[I]f a college has a student newspaper, its publication cannot be sup-
pressed because college officials dislike its editorial comment. This rule 
is but a simple extension of the precept that freedom of expression may 
not be infringed by denying a privilege. . . . 
. . . Censorship of constitutionally protected expression cannot be 
imposed by suspending the editors, suppressing circulation, requiring 
imprimatur of controversial articles, excising repugnant material, with-
drawing financial support, or asserting any other form of censorial over-
sight based on the institution's power of the purse.42 
Two cases have expressly adopted this analysis in the high school 
setting.43 
In other cases, school officials have contended that the newspaper 
is merely a part of the academic curriculum, subject to regulation in 
4-0. 438 U.S. at 749-50. The court referred to the special pervasiveness of broadcasting that 
makes avoidance of the language difficult and to broadcasting's access into the home. 
41. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1971); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 
456, 458-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The 
Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 477, 491 (1981); Garvey, Children and the 
First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 321, 334-35 {1979); Huffman & Trauth, supra note 11, at 
486. 
42. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (discussing a college president's 
attempt to withdraw funding from student newspaper which advocated segregation) (citations 
and footnotes omitted); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943) ("The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against 
the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education not excepted."); Reineke v. Cobb 
County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (school cannot use a shortage of 
funds to justify closing a school newspaper when the shortage was caused by the school's im-
proper confiscation of one issue). Of course, Tinker itself specifically protected a form of student 
expression on school property - the wearing of armbands to protest the Vietnam war. 
43. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), ajfd., 564 F.2d 157 
(4th Cir. 1977); Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Cal. 1976) 
(school cannot arbitrarily select one of two student newspapers as authorized to solicit advertise-
ments necessary to meet publication expenses). 
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the same manner as an English class.44 Courts have treated this claim 
as an issue of fact, reviewing the newspaper to determine whether it is 
a forum for student expression or a part of the curriculum designed 
only to teach the mechanics of writing and publishing.45 As a forum 
for student expression, the noncurricular press in public high schools 
enjoys the same first amendment rights as the adult press, except 
where limited by Tinker's substantial-disruption and invasion-of-rights 
standards46 and Ginsberg's variable obscenity standard.47 Even if the 
paper is adjudged part of the curriculum, Tinker recognizes students' 
first amendment rights to express their views on subjects covered by 
the curriculum so long as they do so in a nondisruptive manner, 
notwithstanding the school's authority to select the content of its cur-
riculum. 48 Thus, while the school may control the topics discussed in 
a curricular press, it may not limit the viewpoints to be expressed 
solely because of disagreement with the content of those views. · 
Schools do have two special concerns which may justify restraint 
of student speech under certain circumstances. First, they must main-
tain the orderly atmosphere necessary for effective education.49 Sec-
44. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Gam-
bino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Va.), ajfd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th 
Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), ajfd. without opinion, 515 
F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This argument 
cannot, of course, justify regulation of the unofficial, "underground" student press, which re-
ceives no financial support from the school. Cf Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 
1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the claim that a school-sponsored assembly was part of the school 
curriculum in striking down disciplinary action against a student for a speech containing sexual 
innuendo). 
45. See Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 735 (E.D. Va.) (student 
newspaper deemed not part of the curriculum despite school's offering a journalism course and 
paying most of the paper's expenses), ajfd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 
F. Supp. 102, 103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (student newspaper deemed a forum for student expression 
despite a school policy limiting articles to school-related topics). See also Note, Religious Expres-
sion in the Public School Forum: The High School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEO. L.J. 
135, 140-49 (1983) (discussing when a public high school has established a public forum for 
student expression, and the consequences of creating such a forum). 
46. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. 
47. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text. 
48. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1984) 
("Defendants are incorrect in stating that constitutional values are not implicated in curricular 
decisions."); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Va.) (permit-
ting the student newspaper to publish an article on contraception even though the school board 
had recently voted specifically not to include contraception in its proposed sex education course), 
ajfd., 564 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) 
("Social studies surely is part of the curriculum. Under defendants' theory, the petitioners in 
Tinker might well not be permitted to wear armbands to protest the Vietnam war since their 
symbolic protest dealt with an area of the curriculum."), ajfd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 
1975). A school has the power to set its curriculum, but where that curriculum is designed only 
to teach students the mechanics of writing and editing, curricular control should be limited to 
sloppy or ungrammatical expression, not expression dealing with "inappropriate" topics. The 
school might be able to limit coverage of a curricular newspaper to certain issues, but it cannot 
prescribe the nature of this coverage. 
49. Cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (permitting, under limited circumstances, 
warrantless searches of students' personal effects by school administrators). 
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ond, they should be able to protect themselves from tort liability. If an 
official school publication such as a school newspaper contains libelous 
material, the school that authorized the publication could be held lia-
ble for damages. so Both the American Bar Association and the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union have recognized the right of high school 
officials to suppress libelous student expression.st 
Ill. THE TIMING OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 
A key question left unanswered by Tinker is whether unprotected 
speech can actually be restrained, or whether relief is limited to post-
publication punishment. Schools that require prior administrative re-
view of student publications have adopted widely varying protections 
for students. 52 Other school districts have tried to avoid the constitu-
tional problems inherent in prior submission by halting distribution of 
the offending material after publication53 or by disciplining the stu-
dents who created the challenged material.54 
SO. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at A26 col. I (commenting on school district's being 
found liable for comments in student newspaper). The RE.sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 228 (1958) states that "a principal is liable for the acts of his agent if the agent is acting within 
the scope of his duties," and if a school establishes a student newspaper, students who publish 
that newspaper are acting within the scope of their authority. See, e.g., Galvin v. New York, 
New Haven & Hartford R.R., 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 262 (1960) (employer liable for slander 
when its security guard publicly accused plaintiff of theft). Of course, this justification exists only 
so long as the students are actually agents of the school. See notes 108·09 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
51. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS 12 (1971); JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN· 
ISfRATION, AMERICAN BAR AssN., STANDARDS RELATING TO SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION 84 
(1982) [hereinafter cited as PROJECT]. The ACLU recommends in the college setting that 
"(w]herever possible a [college] newspaper should be financially and physically separate from the 
college, existing as a legally independent corporation. The college would then be absolved from 
legal liability for the publication and bear no direct responsibility to the community for the views 
expressed." AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COLLEGE CIVIL 
LIBERTIES). 
52. Compare Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975) (regulation defining "libel," 
"obscenity," and "distribution"; providing for a two-pupil-day review period with written rea· 
sons for denying approval; and establishing a three-day appeal procedure invalidated for not 
defining terms and for not ensuring the student a full notice and hearing), with Fujishima v. 
Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (regulation requiring prior approval before distri· 
bution of any written matter on school property with no guidelines for approval, time limit for 
review, or appeal procedures voided as an unconstitutional prior restraint), and Quarterman v. 
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971) (similar regulation declared unconstitutional as a standardless 
prior restraint). 
53. See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980) (approving action of officials who 
barred continued on-campus distribution of an underground newspaper containing advertise-
ments for drug paraphernalia). 
54. See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d IO (7th Cir.) (overturning expulsion ofa student 
for distributing, without approval, an underground newspaper critical of school authorities), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 
1969) (upholding IO-day suspension and removal from student government offices of students 
who distributed a vulgar underground newspaper outside the school gates). 
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The circuits have split on whether prior restraint is constitutionally 
permissible. The Seventh Circuit has held that only postpublication 
punishment can pass constitutional scrutiny,55 while the Second, 
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have held that prior restraints are constitu-
tionally permissible. 56 The relevant language in Tinker refers to "any 
facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties."57 This language implies that school authorities may prohibit ex-
pression before any disruption actually occurs, based solely on a 
reasonable forecast of disruption. 58 This interpretation of the Tinker 
standard allows a system of prior screening so that a school can prop-
erly determine which expression is likely to cause disruption. 
The Seventh Circuit approach, which limits schools to postpublica-
tion relief, neither provides students with increased protection from 
arbitrary decisions nor advances the interests of the school. A limita-
tion on the timing of administrative sanction means that a school can 
take actiQn only after substantial disruption has occurred. Although 
there is a substantial danger of abuse in a system that allows school 
officials to prescreen material criticizing them, the same danger exists 
when these same officials can impose discipline after publication. A 
school official can just as easily impose an arbitrary punishment as an 
arbitrary prior restraint. Nor can postpublication sanctions prevent 
substantial disruption of the classroom, because they lack the deter-
rence found in criminal penalties imposed for similar disruption. 59 
Postpublication review would be equally ineffective in preventing libel, 
for a damage remedy would not deter a high school student lacking 
55. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); see notes 12-14 supra and 
accompanying text. 
56. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Quarterman v. 
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); 
see also Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982); Riseman v. School 
Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971); notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text. 
57. 393 U.S. at 514. 
58. See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (school officials may act before 
disruption occurs and have a duty to prevent such disruption); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. 
School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (school may prohibit expression "if the school 
administration can demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that the expression would engender 
... material and substantial interference"); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1971) 
("The school authorities are not required to 'wait until the potential (for disorder) is realized 
before acting.'" (citation omitted)); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1970) (school 
may outlaw all "message" buttons if it can demonstrate a reasonable fear of disruption from the 
wearing of such buttons, even though no disruption has actually resulted), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 
948 (1971). 
59. High school students are less mature than adults, and may be more willing to challenge 
authority without considering the consequences. Second, and more important, the threat of sus-
pension from school is not a deterrent in the same sense that a criminal penalty is a deterrent. 
Depriving someone of liberty is quite different from forbidding him to do something he would 
otherwise be required to do, such as attending school. Many students would not regard the 
enforced vacation as much of a penalty. 
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resources to indemnify the school. 60 Because a policy of prior re-
straint relies on prevention instead of deterrence, it is more likely to 
succeed. 
Not only would prior submission of school publications more effec-
tively serve the needs of the school administration, but it would also be 
less likely to discourage student speech. Postpublication review can 
have a "chilling effect": a student wishing to address a controversial 
topic might be unwilling to express herself if she thinks her expression 
might subject her to sanctions. This danger is especially acute when 
dealing with vague standards such as "substantial disruption," which 
provide considerable discretion to the reviewer and offer little guid-
ance to the speaker. A properly functioning system of prior submis-
sion, unlike a properly functioning system of subsequent punishment, 
would allow school officials to pass on the potential disruptiveness of 
student expression before the student risked sanctions, approving the 
close cases in advance and thus encouraging the publication of pro-
tected expression that comes close to the borderline. 61 The first 
amendment problems presented by regulation of student expression 
are best solved by proper criteria, clear standards, and close scrutiny 
of administrative decisions whenever made, not by limits on the timing 
of the decisions. 
IV. CRITERIA FOR REGULATION OF THE STUDENT PRESS 
School officials have relied on numerous criteria that they claim 
allow them to suppress student expression. The substantial-disruption 
and invasion-of-rights tests are derived from Tinker. Regulation of 
obscene speech and speech inciting lawless action is permissible under 
the same standards applied to speech addressed to adults. In addition, 
schools have claimed a variety of justifications not explicit in constitu-
tional guidelines and have asserted a right to control the mode of dis-
tribution without regard for the content of the expression. This section 
analyzes the justifications and application of regulations limiting stu-
dent expression and suggests constitutionally sound criteria for regula-
tion of the student press. 
A. Substantial Disruption 
The first part of the Tinker standard permits school officials to reg-
ulate expression that "materially disrupts classwork or involves sub-
60. Without prior submission, the damage liability of the school is dependent upon the judg· 
ment of the newspaper's editorial board - a situation which could lead to stricter supervision, 
curtailment, or abolition of sections of the student press. See also notes 92-95 infra and accompa· 
nying text. 
61. See Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 
B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978). 
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stantial disorder."62 This test is taken from Burnside v. Byars, 63 a 
Fifth Circuit case which arrived at the standard by "balancing . . . 
First Amendment rights with the duty of the state to further and pro-
tect the public school system."64 The compelling state interest in 
maintaining an orderly learning environment was held to justify rea-
sonable regulations to ensure order.65 Tinker offers no definition of 
"material disruption" or "substantial disorder," except to say that 
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression.''66 Most courts, how-
ever, have struck down as vague regulations that merely parrot the 
Tinker language: "It does not at all follow that the phrasing of a con-
stitutional standard by which to decide whether a regulation infringes 
upon rights protected by the first amendment is sufficiently specific in 
a regulation to convey notice to students or people in general of what 
is prohibited."67 
One short definition is found in Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School 
District, which defines "disruption" to mean "a physical disruption 
which constitutes a substantial material threat to the orderly operation 
of the campus."68 This definition would exclude, for instance, a news-
paper editorial questioning the need for a new rule (no physical dis-
ruption) or an article profiling a controversial topic such as drug abuse 
or homosexuality (no physical disruption and no substantial threat to 
order). To satisfy the Tinker test, the fear of substantial disruption 
must be based on "substantial reliable information," not mere intui-
tion. 69 Additionally, the fear must be that the expression itself will be 
62. 393 U.S. at 513 (1969). 
63. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), cited in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
64. 363 F.2d at 748. 
65. 363 F.2d at 748. In Burnside a Qan on the distribution and wearing of "freedom buttons" 
in a Mississippi public school was enjoined as an unreasonable restraint on expression because 
the school b9ard could not demonstrate that any disruption had been caused by the buttons. 363 
F.2d at 748. 
66. 393 U.S. at 508 (1969). 
67. Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 
420 U.S. 128 (1975); accord Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975); Pliscou v. 
Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842, 850 (E.D. Cal. 1976). But see Eisner v. Stam-
ford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding a regulation which refers to 
"disorder'' (without the modifier) as constitutionally sound, although "greater specificity in the 
statement would be highly desirable"). The Eisner court was willing to "assume that the Board 
would never contemplate the futile as well as unconstitutional suppression of matter that would 
create only an immaterial disturbance." 440 F.2d at 808 (emphasis in original). This assumption 
has proved overly optimistic. See, e.g., Balcer v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 
(C.D. Cal. 1969) (student body president suspended for 10 days and stripped of his office for olf-
campus distribution of an underground newspaper containing the word "bullshit" in an adver-
tisement, with no showing of disturbance caused by the newspaper). 
68. 411 F. Supp. at 850. This definition was talcen from Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 
3d 138, 150, 514 P.2d 697, 704, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897, 904 (1973). 
69. Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D.N.H.), vacated and remanded, 502 F.2d 
1159 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (school officials 
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disruptive, not that those holding contrary views will act disrup-
tively. 70 The harm alleged to result from the expression must be the 
likely result of the expression - not necessarily a certain consequence, 
but more than a mere possibility.71 
Several cases illustrate this standard. School officials have been 
held justified in fearing substantial disruption when, the day after a 
widespread student walkout resulting in several suspensions, other stu-
dents distributed leaflets in the halls calling for another walkout the 
next day.72 Similarly, officials have been permitted to halt distribution 
of a student newspaper that contained an inflammatory letter to the 
editor after an investigation revealed that it had not been written by its 
purported author, because the letter was likely to incite both its pur-
ported creator and its ostensible target. 73 The restraints in these cases 
were justified because the school officials could point to specific forms 
of disruption likely to result from the student expression. 
The substantial-disruption standard has been overextended on sev-
eral occasions when school officials have attempted to restrain off-
campus expression or to discipline students for off-campus distribution 
of material alleged to violate school standards. 74 One court has up-
held sanctions against students for off-campus distribution of an un-
derground newspaper based on reports of classes disrupted by students 
reading the paper and the principal's testimony that an "underground 
newspaper" would "diminish control and discipline,"75 although the 
justified in fearing disruption from the wearing of political buttons, given recent school history of 
racial turmoil), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971). 
70. Butts v. Dallas lndep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731-32 (5th Cir. 1971) (wearing of 
black armbands to protest Vietnam War held not disruptive, although the administration feared 
that war supporters would tear olfthe armbands and create a disturbance). Feiner v. New York, 
340 U.S. 315 (1951), established a "fighting words" exception to the first amendment, holding 
that a speaker whose language creates an imminent danger to public order by inciting others to 
attack him may be convicted of disorderly conduct. However, Feiner should not be applied in 
the school setting. First, Feiner involves not a prior restraint as in the school setting, but rather a 
subsequent sanction. Moreover, because students are less mature than adults, the risk of contro-
versial speech causing a disruption increases, and students are in such close and continued prox-
imity that the disputants will be unable to avoid one another. Applying Feiner would permit 
school officials to use the rule "solely as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views," a 
use forbidden by Feiner. 340 U.S. at 321. 
71. See Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (school officials' fear of disruption 
judged reasonable, although no disruption actually resulted from the expression), cert. denied, 
401 U.S. 948 (1971). 
72. Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981). The court upheld the suspensions of 
the students who produced the leaflets. 
73. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The letter, allegedly written by 
the lacrosse team, threatened to "kick the greasy ass" of the newspaper editor unless more sports 
articles were forthcoming. The editor responded with invective of her own. The court identified 
two possible sources of disruption: friction between the team and the editors, and friction be-
tween the team and the actual authors of the letter. 463 F. Supp. at 1050-51. 
74. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 
(1980); Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th .Cir. 1971); Baker v. Downey 
City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969). 
75. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 524-25 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The 
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principal had only a generalized, undifferentiated fear that his author-
ity would be diminished. But questioning the authority of school offi-
cials is often a primary purpose of underground student newspapers, 
and any effective criticism may diminish official authority.76 School 
officials may not use their supervising power over students to silence 
all views contrary to their own; the substantial-disruption standard 
justifies only actions to prevent disruption of classrooms, not an attack 
on the newspaper itself. A proper response to the threat of classroom 
disruption would have been to confiscate copies read during class. 
This less restrictive alternative would permit circulation of the news-
paper with no likelihood of classroom disruption.77 
The special power over the student press given to school officials 
reflects the officials' duty to preserve order in the schools, not any re-
duced protection for juvenile speech as such. 78 When the justification 
disappears, so does the power. 79 The power to control students' off-
campus activities not affecting the orderly operation of the school rests 
with the parents and the state, 80 not with school authorities. 
B. Invasion of the Rights of Others 
The second part of the Tinker test indicates that student expression 
constituting an "invasion of the rights of others" is not protected by 
the first amendment. 81 This test is taken from Blackwell v. Issaquena 
County Board of Education, 82 where students distributing buttons sim-
court cited a provision of the school board policy that required students "to maintain high Stan· 
dards of personal conduct" and a section of the California Code that required students to "re-
frain entirely from the use of profane or vulgar language." 
76. Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) ("Criticism of ... official 
conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and 
hence diminishes . . . official reputations"). 
77. Cf. Schneider v. State (Town oflrvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating ordinance 
forbidding distribution of literature in public places though ordinance had been advanced as 
necessary to prevent littering; a less restrictive alternative would be to punish the litterers 
directly). 
78. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[B]ecause school offi-
cials have ventured out of the school yard and into the general community where the freedom 
accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind 
government officials in the public arena."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); see also Shanley v. 
Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to adopt a blanket 
rule against punishment for off-campus activities, but suggesting such punishment should be left 
to other authorities). 
79. If off-campus distribution results in substantial disruption of school activities, then the 
school may discipline the distributors under the Tinker standard, but may not restrain the distri-
bution. Any claim of substantial disruption resulting from off-campus distribution must be ana-
lyzed closely to determine whether the disruption was actually caused by the distributors or by 
those who brought the material onto campus. 
80. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 
(1980). 
81. 393 U.S. at 513. 
82. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
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ilar to those protected in Burnside v. Byars 83 did so in part by accost-
ing their peers in the halls and pinning buttons to their clothing. 84 
Because the right to express oneself includes the right not to express 
the opinions of others, 85 students who pin buttons on unwilling pass-
ersby are invading the rights of those individuals and can thus be 
stopped.86 
The Second Circuit has grossly distorted the meaning of the inva-
sion-of-rights test. In Trachtman v. Anker, 81 the court held, over a 
vigorous dissent, that a student newspaper's distributing to New York 
City high school students a questionnaire on sexual attitudes and ex-
periences and then publishing the results would "invade the rights of 
other students by subjecting them to psychological pressures which 
may engender significant emotional harm."88 This is precisely the 
kind of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance that, 
under Tinker, cannot justify any regulation at all, 89 especially when, as 
here, the surveys were to be both anonymous and voluntary, ensuring 
that students who did not wish to participate need not have done so.90 
Because of this potential abuse of the invasion-of-rights standard, it is 
crucial that the standard be strictly circumscribed. 
"Invasion of the rights of others" must refer only to a tortious act, 
83. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text. 
84. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 752 (1966). The court approved a total ban on the buttons rather 
than direct punishment for disruption because "the reprehensible conduct ••• was so inexorably 
tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable." 363 F.2d at 754. 
85. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not compel motorists to display 
official state motto on license plates); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 lJ.S. 624 
(1943) (state may not compel public school students to salute the flag). 
86. The passersby also have a cause of action in tort for the unauthorized contact with their 
persons. See w. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 40 (5th ed. 1984); REsTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 19 (1965). 
87. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). 
88. 563 F.2d at 516. The court accorded great deference to the members of the school board, 
looking to see only if they "had demonstrated a substantial basis for their conclusion," 563 F.2d 
at 519, rather than balancing the conflicting testimony from both sides' experts. It distinguished 
other cases which had held that information about student sexuality was protected, saying that 
those cases involved the dissemination, not the compilation, of information. 563 F.2d at 516 n.2. 
The dissent reminded the majority that a cover letter attached to the survey assured students 
their'answers would be anonymous and that no one had to respond, 563 F.2d at 522, and that the 
local daily newspapers regularly published information on the "forbidden topics," 563 F.2d at 
521. The dissent also protested the lack of weight accorded plaintiff's experts, and objected that 
"a general undifferentiated fear of emotional disturbance . . . strikes me as too nebulous and as 
posing too dangerous a potential for unjustifiable destruction of constitutionally protected free 
speech rights to support a prior restraint." 563 F.2d at 521. For a discussion of the proper 
deference to be accorded the judgment of school officials, see notes 161-75 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
89. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
90. Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 515. Many school districts routinely administer a battery of tests 
to their pupils with no such safeguards. For a good discussion of the problems presented by 
schools' information-gathering and testing, see Comment, Access to Student Records in Wiscon-
sin: A Comparative Analysis of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 and Wis· 
consin Statute Section 118.25, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 975, 975-84. 
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such as the accosting in Blackwell, or in the context of student publi-
cations, to libel or personal abuse. Tort standards define when an act 
"invades the rights of another" to such an extent that the person 
wronged should recover damages. Limiting school action under the 
invasion-of-rights justification to torts or potential torts means that a 
school can refer to previously defined legal standards to decide if it 
may constitutionally restrain student expression. Moreover, limiting 
"invasion of rights" to tortious behavior fulfills the primary function 
of this justification for restraint - allowing the school to protect itself 
from tort liability for its students' actions.91 
Libel is the most obvious potential tort resulting from the activities 
of the student press. For example, in Frasca v. Andrews, 92 the school 
newspaper planned to print an anonymous letter to the editor critical 
of a student government official. 93 The principal investigated and de-
termined that the article was substantially untrue, but the newspaper 
editor stood by the letter while refusing to document its charges. The 
principal, fearing possible legal action against the school, confiscated 
all copies of the newspaper. 94 The court correctly permitted the 
seizure under the invasion-of-rights standard.95 
Schools should have a similar right to prevent publication of mat-
ter that could result in other forms of tort liability for the school. 
While mere personal abuse or vituperative language directed at a spe-
cific individual is not tortious,96 the Second Restatement of Torts con-
siders "conduct intended to cause emotional distress" to be a separate 
cause of action.97 The American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice 
Standards Project would permit restriction of student expression that 
"advocates racial, religious, or ethnic prejudice or discrimination or 
91. See notes 94-95 infra and accompanying text. 
92. 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
93. The letter called the student "a total disgrace to the school" and said he maintained a low 
academic average, had been suspended from school, and had falsified his grades on the school 
computer. 463 F. Supp. at 1046. 
94. The principal concluded that "several of [the letter's] statements were false and, in his 
opinion, libelous; that its publication would have a devastating impact on [the subject of the 
statements], and that there would be no reasonable opportunity to reply," for the issue was to be 
distributed on the last day of school. 463 F. Supp. at 1047-48. 
95. 463 F. Supp. at 1052. The court followed the Trachtman standard criticized above, see 
note 88 supra and accompanying text, but a narrower reading of the invasion-of-rights test still 
supports the result. The allegation of grade changing is libelous if untrue, and the school system 
would be liable for damages. See note 50 supra. 
96. See Crozman v. Callahan, 136 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1955) (no liability where supe-
rior officer called airman a "God-damned Stooge" and a "f-king bastard"); Cowan v. Time 
Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 198, 245 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1963) (no liability where photo of plaintiff and others 
published in national magazine, captioned "Some Idiots Afloat"). 
97. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46(1) (1965). This tort requires "conduct ... so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of de-
cency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community," pro-
vided the conduct actually does cause severe emotional distress to the victim. Id. Comment d. 
642 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:625 
seriously disparages particular racial, religious, or ethnic groups. "98 
The Project cautions that to fall under this rule, material must actually 
advocate discrimination or seriously disparage particular groups.99 
This limiting language is designed to protect both scholarly works 
with controversial theses and the use of emotion-laden terms for dra-
matic effect. I00 The Project's definition of student expression likely to 
cause emotional distress, when coupled with subsequent expert review, 
presents another constitutionally permissible standard for prior re-
straint of student expression. 
Publication of truthful information can, in certain circumstances, 
also be tortious. Some details of a person's life may not be published 
without the person's consent. Unauthorized publication of this infor-
mation constitutes the publicity or public disclosure of private facts, 
one aspect of the tort of invasion of privacy. IOI The Project's guide-
lines, following the Restatement, permit restriction of expression that 
"is violative of another person's right of privacy by publicly exposing 
details of such person's life, the exposure of which would be offensive 
and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibili-
ties .... "I02 Thus, a student newspaper can be penalized for disclos-
ing intimate details of named students' sex livesI03 or prevented from 
disclosing the contents of school discipline records, I04 As with the 
tort of libel or inducing emotional distress, if student expression con-
stitutes an invasion of privacy under the legal standard, a school board 
may legitimately restrain its publication. 
Even a regulation based on an invasion-of-rights standard may 
98. PROJECT, supra note 51, at 84. According to the Project, the greater susceptibility of 
youth to negative influences can justify regulation in schools: "It has long been recognized that 
moral indoctrination and socialization are valid and important parts of the educative function of 
schools." Id. at 86. 
99. PROJECT, supra note 51, at 90 (emphasis in original). 
100. For examples of works that should be protected, see Baker v. Downey City Bd. of 
Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (challenging article entitled "The Student as Nigger," 
comparing the status of students to that of slaves); A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING (1980) 
(arguing that I.Q. tests are not biased against English·speaking minorities who typically perform 
worse than whites); cf Mikolinski v. Burt Reynolds Production Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 895, 409 
N.E.2d 1324 (1980) (dismissing suit by Polish-Americans who claimed they were defamed by 
ethnic jokes in a movie). 
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). For a discussion of the origin 
and scope of this doctrine, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 86, at 849-54, 856-63. 
102. PROJECT, supra note 51, at 84. Cf Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 
606, 610 (1956) (news dispatch that 12-year-old married woman gave birth to a normal, healthy 
child not reasonably calculated to embarrass or humiliate plaintiffs or cause mental distress). 
103. In 1977 an alternative campus newspaper at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
published a "Consumer Guide to M.I.T. Men," naming and rating the sexual prowess of 36 
students with whom the authors claimed to have had sexual relations. The editor who originated 
the idea was suspended from school for three months, and the authors were placed on probation. 
See Sex Ratings Set Off M.LT. Furor, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1977, at A18, col. 2; Students Are 
Disciplined/or M.LT. Sex Ratings, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1977, at A9, col. 6. 
104. See Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (letter charging student had 
been suspended from school held an unprotected disclosure). 
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pose a constitutional problem if phrased in tort language. One court 
has held that the word "libelous" is a term of art and impermissibly 
vague when used in a regulation designed for laymen and students, 
especially because some forms of libel are constitutionally pro-
tected.105 Thus, although tort language may properly define when a 
school may constitutionally restrain student expression, the technical 
terms do not give enough information to the potential victims of a 
restraint - the students. The standard that governs prior restraint of 
allegedly obscene material suggests a method to reconcile the need for 
standards phrased in tort language with the potential of abuse that 
stems from the vagueness of legal terminology: permit limited prior 
restraint, but only until an outside, expert opinion can be obtained. 106 
This procedural safeguard of review by legal counsel should apply to 
any prior restraint by a school board under the invasion-of-rights stan-
dard. It would allow school boards to protect themselves from tort 
suits, while quick legal review of a decision to restrain would deter -
and ultimately prevent - unconstitutional abuse of the standard. 
Another constitutional protection for the student press is the limit 
of school authority. School administrators must remember that the 
invasion-of-rights doctrine is designed to allow the school to keep tor-
tious expression out of its publications, not otherwise to limit the first 
amendment rights of students.107 Under this standard, a school can 
only restrict student expression where the school would be liable for 
the consequences of that expression. An underground newspaper that 
receives no money or official recognition from the school does not be-
come the school's responsibility simply because students prepare the 
newspaper on school premises108 or because the newspaper is distrib-
105. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Bright v. Los 
Angeles Unified School Dist., 18 Cal. 3d 450, 463-64, 556 P.2d 1090, 1098-99, 134 Cal. Rptr. 
639, 647-48 (1976). Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public 
official must prove "actual malice" to recover damages for defamation). Criticism of school 
board members or high administrators would likely fall under the Sullivan rule, as these officials 
are "public figures" in the local community. 
106. See note 26 supra. Unlike obscenity, where the challenged work is itself the most mate-
rial evidence, libel may present many difficult proof problems and is unsuited for summary judi-
cial resolution. Given the need for a swift decision concerning the nature of the alleged libel so as 
not to prejudice the student's rights, the best solution is to permit suppression of allegedly 
libelous material only until competent, independent legal advice can be obtained. The student 
would have the same right to review of this opinion as he would have of an adverse determination 
by the school board. See notes 157-75 infra and accompanying text. This approach would pro-
tect the student from the decisions of school officials acting beyond their field of expertise and 
would also protect the school from liability for damages. It was endorsed in Reineke v. Cobb 
County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See also CoLLEGE CIVIL LIBER-
TIES, supra note 51, at 15 (if college newspaper not legally independent from the school, school 
should only veto an article after "a specific finding of potential libel as determined by an impar-
tial legal authority"). 
107. See notes 91-106 supra and accompanying text. 
108. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 
(1980). The students in Thomas had produced a satire of their school. School officials ordered 
them to keep it away from campus, so the students sold the paper at a nearby store, but purchas-
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uted on school grounds. 109 For these unofficial newspapers, the inva-
sion-of-rights ground for prior restraint by the school does not apply; 
Tinker permits administrative regulation only under the substantial 
disruption standard.110 
C. Subversive Incitement, Obscenity, and Vulgarity 
The Tinker test is not the only standard for measuring the protec-
tion to be accorded student speech. Anything not protected for 
adults111 is not protected for students. While student speech is un-
likely to endanger national security, it may be obscene or incite illegal 
action. Therefore, school officials have often attempted to apply these 
limitations on adult speech to student publications. 
The illegal-incitement doctrine permits the punishment only of 
"advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or promoting imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 112 Because any 
expression meeting this standard would also meet the substantial-dis-
ruption test, the illegal-incitement standard is superfluous in the con-
text of the student press. Nevertheless, school boards have tried to use 
the illegal-incitement test to go beyond the limits of the substantial-
disruption standard. Under the illegal-incitement test, school boards 
have attempted to justify, for example, a one-semester suspension for 
an editorial urging students to throw away school handouts intended 
for their parents113 or the confiscation of a sex-information supple-
ment aimed at senior high school students. 114 But these examples of 
student expression do not meet that portion of the illegal-incitement 
ers brought several copies onto school grounds. The court voided the suspensions of the authors, 
holding that the newspaper was not connected to the school and that the officials' actions had to 
be judged against the adult standards for restraints on speech. 607 F.2d at 1050. 
109. The students are not agents of the school, but independent actors using school grounds 
as they might use a sidewalk to distribute literature. School officials may therefore discipline 
them for disruptive distribution or distribution that violates content-neutral distribution policies, 
but may not use content-based standards to judge their expression. See, e.g., Heffron v. Interna-
tional Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981). Nor can the school be held 
liable for any defamation contained in such a newspaper. See, e.g., Milliner v. Turner, 436 So. 2d 
1300 (La. App. 1983). 
110. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text. 
111. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. 
112. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
113. See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970). 
The school board charged the students with "an immediate advocacy of, and incitement to, disre-
gard of school administrative procedures." 425 F.2d at 12. The court held that no discipline 
could be permitted without a showing that disruption was in fact likely to result from the expres-
sion. 425 F.2d at 15. See also Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) (invali-
dating prohibition of material advocating illegal actions when no fear of substantial disruption). 
114. See Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), ajfd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d 
Cir. 1975). School officials claimed that publication of the supplement would be a "clear and 
present danger'' to students. The court disagreed, finding it "ironic that defendants view the 
dissemination of knowledge here as presenting a 'danger' which will bring about 'evils.' " 383 F. 
Supp. at 1165-66. 
December 1984] Note - High School Press 645 
test that requires a likelihood of "imminent lawless action"; restraints 
on these types of expression therefore require justification under some 
other standard. The illegal-incitement test adds nothing to the proper 
criteria for regulation of student expression, but dangerously increases 
the potential for regulatory abuse. 
The constitutional standard for obscenity exempts from first 
amendment protection only "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to 
the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 115 Student expression that 
meets this standard is not protected from regulation under the first 
amendment. But, as with the illegal-incitement standard, school 
boards have attempted to use the obscenity standard to justify consti-
tutionally dubious restraints of student expression. For example, 
school boards have often equated obscenity and vulgarity, disciplining 
students for four-letter words uttered in nonsexual contexts. 116 
While Ginsberg v. New York and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation pro-
vide a lower standard of protection for expression directed at mi-
nors, 117 a realistic appraisal of the sensibilities of high school students 
indicates that four-letter words per se are not obscene for high 
schoolers.118 These same vulgarisms can be heard daily on the 
115. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Such works would include "[p]atently 
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or 
simulated," and "[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory 
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at 25. 
116. See Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 1973) ("earthy 
words relating to bodily functions and sexual intercourse" in a letter to the editor in an under-
ground newspaper held not substantially disruptive and not restrainable), vacated as moot, 420 
U.S. 128 (1975); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 n.7 (7th Cir. 1972) ("profan-
ity and vulgarisms" in underground newspaper not restrainable); Reineke v. Cobb County 
School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (one appearance of the word "damn" in 
official student newspaper not disruptive); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 
1972) ("four Jetter words" in student literary annual not obscene for high school students, nor 
disruptive). But see Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.) (vulgarity-
riddled Jetter in underground newspaper, captioned "High Skool Is F . . . ed," justifies discipline 
when distributor made no effort to comply with school prior-submission rules and shouted pro-
fanity at school officials), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 
307 F. Supp. 517, 523-25 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ("multiple vulgarisms," including one use of "bull-
shit" in advertisement in underground newspaper, justify discipline under state education code). 
CJ Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), which held that "such expression must be, in some 
significant way, erotic," 403 U.S. at 20, and overturned the breach-of-the-peace conviction of a 
man who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse. The jacket was 
plainly visible to children present in the courthouse. 403 U.S. at 16. 
In Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985), the school board 
suspended a student for three days after he nominated a candidate for student government office. 
His speech was laden with sexual innuendo, but contained no offensive words. A divided Court 
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's injunction against discipline, fearing that any regulation 
based on such an amorphous standard of "indecency" would give school officials excessive dis-
cretion in regulating the content of student expression. 755 F.2d at 1363. 
117. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text. 
118. "Realistically, high school students are beyond the point of being sheltered from the 
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streets119 and can be found on the shelves of the high school library.120 
Any seventeen-year-old - the age of a typical high school junior or 
senior - may attend R-rated movies containing virtually every form 
of spoken vulgarity without parental consent. Concern for adolescent 
sensibilities does not warrant restricting expression freely available to 
students in other contexts, especially where the restriction would keep 
students from reading their own words. 121 Under Tinker, the school is 
free to restrict any expression, without recourse to obscenity law, that 
is likely to cause substantial disruption or invade the rights of others. 
Any further extension of the obscenity standard threatens to chill stu-
dent expression properly protected by the first amendment.122 
D. Other Content-Based Justifications 
While the three categories above encompass the majority of chal-
lenges to student speech, several other categories merit discussion. In 
Williams v. Spencer, 123 the Fourth Circuit upheld the confiscation of 
an underground student newspaper containing an advertisement for 
drug paraphernalia, as violating a regulation against material that 
"[e]ncourages actions which endanger the health or safety of stu-
dents."124 The court said that the regulation was not void for vague-
ness, because it was impractical to define each of "the infinite variety 
of materials that might be found to encourage actions which endanger 
the health or safety of students," and because "a reasonably intelligent 
high school student would . . . know" that an advertisement for drug 
paraphernalia violated the rule. 12s 
This decision appears inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's earlier 
holdings that the terms "substantial disruption," "libel," and "obscen-
ity," taken from the relevant Supreme Court standards, were imper-
potpourri of sights and sounds we encounter at every turn in our daily lives." Fraser v. Bethel 
School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985). 
119. See Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Baker v. Downey 
City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (upholding discipline under state rule 
requiring students to "refrain entirely from the use of profane and vulgar language") (emphasis in 
opinion). 
120. See Sullivan v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1165-66 (1969) (citing 
five books and two magazines found on shelves in the school system's libraries which contained 
the challenged vulgarism), vacated, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973). 
121. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), expressly authorizes states to prohibit the 
sale of soft-core pornography to those of high school age, but Ginsberg involves pictorial, not 
written, expression. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973), implies that verbal expres-
sion enjoys a greater degree of protection than does pictorial expression, a distinction which 
should limit Ginsberg to vulgar pictures. 
122. Occasional profanity is not disruptive per se for high school students, but if used in a 
disruptive manner the language can be regulated. 
123. 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980). 
124. 622 F.2d at 1205. 
125. 622 F.2d at 1205. 
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missibly vague.126 While the school board is within its rights to ban 
advertisements for marijuana pipes and cocaine-related parapherna-
lia, 127 the literal application of a standard that allows suppression of 
expression that may "endanger the health or safety of students" would 
also outlaw cigarette advertising, thus permitting the confiscation of 
almost every national periodical. Such a standard lends itself too read-
ily to capricious application. In contrast to tort standards, which are 
inherently vague when addressed to high school students and thus 
should be coupled with subsequent review to ensure proper application 
of the legal standard, 128 standards that do not depend on legal or tech-
nical usage can be more explicitly defined. The school board must 
give the "reasonably intelligent high school student" more explicit 
guidance as to the grounds for regulation. 
Other school districts have tried to suppress student-sponsored dis-
cussions of sexuality.129 In the absence of any clear-cut rationale for 
such censorship, the schools have contended that the dissemination of 
information about sex would create substantial disruption, 130 invade 
the rights of others,131 or intrude into the curriculum.132 None of 
these claims distinguishes the discussion of sexuality from the "discus-
sion" of the Vietnam War permitted in Tinker, 133 and all should be 
rejected. However a school chooses to discuss - or ignore - sexual 
issues in its curriculum, it cannot assert that all outside discussion of 
sexual topics is disruptive or violative of others' rights. 
A different form of content-based regulation addresses the form 
rather than the substance of student expression. Almost all high 
schools appoint a faculty advisor to oversee the student newspaper and 
exert some influence over its content. The advisor adds to the educa-
126. See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 
F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973). 
127. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982). 
128. See text following note 90 supra. 
129. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (survey of students' sexual atti-
tudes and activities), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 
462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (birth-control information in underground newspaper); Gambino v. 
Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.) (birth-control information in official 
high school newspaper), affd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (student newspaper supplement containing information about contraception 
and abortion), affd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Opinion letter R81-065 Arizona Attor-
ney General (May 8, 1981) (advising school it could not block an advertisement for contracep-
tives in the student newspaper). 
130. Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972); Bayer v. 
Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975). 
131. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 
(1978). 
132. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. 
133. For example, under the rationale of Trachtman, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), which 
upheld the suppression of a student sexuality survey, an article criticizing American soldiers' 
presence in Vietnam could be banned as likely to cause severe emotional harm to students whose 
relatives were fighting or had been killed in the war. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. 
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tional experience of working on a school paper by editing grammar, 
spelling, and style; suggesting a format; and often commenting on the 
suitability of a particular article. 134 A few school boards have at-
tempted to impose a similar control on underground newspapers. One 
district enacted a regulation requiring all unsanctioned newspapers to 
"conform to the journalistic standards of accuracy, taste, and decency 
maintained by the newspapers of general circulation in Arlington." 135 
It was summarily voided as a standardless "monument to vague-
ness." 136 Thus, it seems clear that "expression by high school students 
cannot be prohibited solely because other students, teachers, adminis-
trators, or parents may disagree with its content."137 Nor can officials 
prohibit or restrict expression solely because they believe it inaccurate 
or ungrammatical; 138 neither flaw supports a forecast of substantial 
disruption 139 or any of the other justifications for suppression.140 
Other schools have barred distribution of commercial literature or 
prevented the sale, or distribution for donation, of newspapers on cam-
pus.141 These regulations, which have been defended as necessary to 
prevent the schoolyard from becoming a commercial marketplace, are 
overbroad. They prevent reader-supported publications from taking 
root without any showing that such publications are disruptive.142 
The school can effect its legitimate end - preventing students from 
being deluged with commercial material - through regulations re-
stricting not content, but the time, place, and manner of distribution 
on campus. It must therefore use this less restrictive alternative. 
134. The advisor should remember that he is in fact the first line of censorship. He is free to 
criticize an article or a topic as unsuitable for the paper, but except for the circumstances that 
permit administrative restraint, all final decisions pertaining to the content of the paper should be 
made by the student editorial staff. With a "curricular newspaper" the advisor has more control 
over content. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text. The presence of an advisor should 
also eliminate any additional administrative review over the paper unless the advisor contends 
that a given article should be suppressed. 
135. Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 747 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1977). 
136. Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 748 (E.D. Va. 1977). 
137. Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972). School 
sponsorship of a newspaper established as a forum for student opinion does not offer any basis for 
additional authority over the content of the newspaper: "The Constitution forbids a State to 
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required 
to create the forum in the first place." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981). 
138. Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (citing 
Schiffv. Williams, 529 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
139. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972); Reineke v. 
Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
140. See, e.g., text at note 49-51 supra. 
141. See Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 
420 U.S. 128 (1975); Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Neb. 1977); Peterson v. Board 
of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Neb. 1973). Commercial speech is protected by the first amend-
ment, though it is not accorded the same protection as other speech. See Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). 
142. Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 
420 U.S. 128 (1975); Peterson v. Board of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 1208, 1214 (D. Neb. 1973). 
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A final form of content-based regulation concerns anonymity. 
School officials have claimed that unless the authors of all material 
distributed in the schools are known to them, the school will be unable 
to discipline those responsible for libelous or obscene material. 143 But 
such a regulation is so broad that the "chilling effect" it would have on 
free speech far outweighs its benefits. Students would be deterred 
from any criticism of school officials if they knew that they had to 
reveal their names to those same offi.cials.144 The identity of a student 
who brings libelous or obscene matter to campus can be discovered 
through the ordinary disciplinary procedures, in the same way the 
school identifies students who bring drugs to campus, without encour-
aging students with legitimate grievances to remain silent for fear of 
administrative reprisals. 
E. Restrictions on Distribution 
Another form of regulation addresses the manner of distribution, 
not its content. Reasonable rules governing the time, place, and man-
ner of on-campus distribution of literature support the legitimate in-
terest of school officials in maintaining order145 and should be 
permitted.146 However, the burden should still rest on the school to 
justify such regulations. 147 Because time, place, and manner rules per-
mit only subsequent punishment for violators, they are constitution-
ally preferable to rules requiring prior submission; 148 indeed, a court 
which barred prior submission entirely specifically authorized time, 
place, and manner rules. 149 Non-content-based regulation presents 
clear-cut issues and can be easily handled: reasonable time, place, and 
143. See Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as 
moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). 
144. Jacobs, 490 F.2d at 607. Cf Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (invalidating 
a city ordinance requiring the identification of all pamphleteers, noting the "important role in the 
progress of mankind" played by anonymous authors such as the creators of the Federalist 
Papers). 
145. The first amendment does not grant speakers an absolute right to say what they want, 
when they want. Governments may impose restrictions on speech in the interest of preserving 
order, so long as those regulations are narrowly drawn and are not based on the content of the 
speech to be regulated. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 
U.S. 640 (1981); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Peterson v. Board 
of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Neb. 1973). 
146. Three circuits have explicitly authorized time, place, and manner rules in schools. See 
Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Fujishima v. Board of 
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 149 (1st 
Cir. 1971). 
147. Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 (5th Cir. 1972); see also 
Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972). 
148. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 
F.2d 1355, 1357 (7th Cir. 1972); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 149 (1st Cir. 1971). 
149. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1357, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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manner regulations are valid so long as they are narrowly drafted to 
achieve the school's legitimate end of maintaining order. 
To summarize, the Constitution does not protect all forms of ex-
pression. School officials may restrain or halt distribution of any ma-
terial that the officials have reasonable cause to believe will: (1) 
produce a substantial physical disruption of the orderly operation of 
the school (including incitement to illegal actions);150 (2) constitute a 
tortious invasion of the rights of others, whether by content or by 
manner of distribution;151 or (3) satisfy the legal definition of obscen-
ity.152 These definitions should be strictly construed to avoid infringe-
ment of students' first amendment rights. All other student expression 
should receive the same protection as adult expression, yet, like adult 
expression, still be subject to reasonable, nondiscriminatory restric-
tions on the time, place, and manner of its distribution. 153 To ensure 
that student speech is adequately protected, school regulations should 
be subject to judicial review especially tailored to the school setting. 
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATIONS REsTRICTING SPEECH 
Restraints of student speech must be viewed against the backdrop 
of the hard line the Supreme Court has taken against prior restraints 
on speech promulgated by administrative agencies. On five occasions 
the Court has insisted that "any restraint prior to judicial review can 
be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the purpose of 
preserving the status quo,"154 that is, "for the shortest fixed period 
compatible with sound judicial resolution."155 The burden of institut-
ing legal proceedings and proving the unprotected nature of the mate-
rial must rest with the agency. 156 Because a system of prior 
submission of student publications to a school official risks becoming a 
forbidden censorship system, it appears to warrant the same safe-
guards mandated by the Supreme Court in other contexts. 
150. See notes 62-80 supra and accompanying text. 
151. See notes 81-110 supra and accompanying text. 
152. See notes 115-22 supra and accompanying text. 
153. See notes 145-49 supra and accompanying text. 
154. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); see also New York Times 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); B.antam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). The Court has also 
struck down a number of restraints imposed with judicial approval. See Vance v. Universal 
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (injunction against habitual use of premises for exhibition 
of obscene material); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (injunction against 
publication of details of a murder trial until after jury impaneled); Organization for a Better 
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (injunction against distribution ofliterature charging real-
estate broker with frightening whites from an area); Carroll v. President & Commrs. of Princess 
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (injunction against white-supremacist rally); Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697, 700 (1931) (injunction against publication of a "malicious, scandalous, and defama-
tory" newspaper). 
155. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). 
156. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975). 
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Lower courts have uniformly upheld the right of students to a 
prompt and appealable decision, 157 one which relies on clearly defined 
procedures and substantive criteria.158 But while they have been will-
ing to grant students the right to appeal through the school system, 
the courts have been unwilling to mandate judicial review of school 
board decisions. In the leading case, Eisner v. Stamford Board of Edu-
cation, the Second Circuit declared: 
[I]t would be highly disruptive to the educational process if a secondary 
school principal were required to take a school newspaper editor to court 
every time the principal reasonably anticipated disruption and sought to 
restrain its cause. Thus, we will not require school officials to seek a 
judicial decree before they may enforce the Board's policy.159 
The Eisner court's argument is not entirely persuasive. While the 
special situation of the school can justify some restraints on otherwise 
protected speech, 160 the school's interest in an orderly learning envi-
ronment is not compelling enough to justify prior restraint of student 
expression with no review by a disinterested body. 
Such review is necessary for several reasons. Most obviously, the 
officials who will be reviewing student expression are likely also to be 
the targets of that expression, making objective evaluation difficult. 
Furthermore, school officials have no special grounding in the consti-
tutional questions or legal definitions relevant to a restraint decision, 
making it inappropriate for them to render ultimate decisions on mat-
ters of free speech. Eisner reflects much more confidence in the judg-
ment of school officials than the facts warrant:161 among cases that 
reached the federal courts, students prevailed in three out of every 
four challenges to regulations or disciplinary actions.162 Other student 
challengers were doubtless dissuaded by the time and expense neces-
sary to bring a case to court.163 
Yet the Eisner court correctly suggests that the school setting is 
different from settings frequently dealt with by the Supreme Court. 
157. See, e.g .. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. 
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1973); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 
803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971). 
158. See, e.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 811 (2d Cir. 1971) (proscrip-
tion against "distributing" written or printed materiai without prior consent held unconstitution-
ally vague); accord Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1349 (4th Cir. 1973) ("libelous" 
and "obscene" imprecise); see also Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) ("sub-
stantial disruption" imprecise). 
159. 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971). 
160. See notes 62-110 supra and accompanying text. 
161. See, e.g .. notes 54, 129, 135, 141 supra and accompanying text. 
162. Twenty-six out of thirty-four regulations or disciplinary measures were invalidated. 
163. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (striking a statute requiring prior 
approval of motion pictures as Jacking adequate procedural safeguards. The Court held: "With-
out these safeguards, it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor's determina-
tion. . . . The . . . stake . . . may be insufficient to warrant a protracted and onerous course of 
litigation."). 
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The Court has required putative censors to obtain judicial review 
before suppressing books deemed unfit for minors, 164 or movies or 
stage productions considered obscene. 165 In both instances the state 
interest is the same: to protect the community, or a part of it, from 
unsuitable material. This interest also exists in the school setting, but 
other interests are unique to the schools. Schools are charged with 
maintaining order and are concerned with protecting themselves from 
tort liability.166 These interests might lead the school to prefer no offi-
cial student press to an uncontrollable student press or to one that 
could only be controlled through a cumbersome judicial mecha-
nism.167 A certain degree of review is provided by the appeals process 
within the educational system, a protection not always found in the 
procedures limiting adult speech condemned by the Supreme Court. 168 
The best solution, taking into account both the presumption of un-
constitutionality attached to all forms of press censorship and the spe-
cial circumstances of the academic setting, is an intermediate level of 
judicial involvement. In contrast to the adult context, a school should 
not need to seek judicial approval before enforcing its regulations, but 
the student faced with a restraint should have the right to tum to the 
courts for review of the decision.169 If the student does so, the school 
should then have the burden of justifying its regulations.170 The Fifth 
Circuit explained why the burden is properly placed on the school: 
We see no reason to toy with Tinker's placement of that burden on the 
164. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
165. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
U.S. 51 (1965); cf Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (requiring the government to initiate 
judicial review before censoring unsolicited obscene mail). 
166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See notes 
49-50 supra and accompanying text. 
167. There is no requirement that a school fund a student newspaper, but any restrictions on 
distribution of underground newspapers must conform to constitutional standards. See notes 74-
80, 108-09 supra and accompanying text. 
168. Compare Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1977) (review of princi-
pal's decision first by the Administrator of Student Affairs, then by the Chancellor, and finally by 
the Secretary of the Board of Education), with Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 
548 (1975) (directors of a municipal theater decided, without further review, what was "in the 
best interest of the community"), and Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (no 
review). 
169. The student could maintain an action against school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1982) for their deprivation of his civil rights under color oflaw. See, e.g., Zucker v. Panitz, 299 
F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
170. This is essentially the approach adopted by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See Baugh-
man v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School 
Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 n.11 (4th Cir. 
1971) (a public school need not seek judicial review before disciplining students for violating 
prior-submission rules or suppressing material which violates the rules). But see Trachtman v. 
Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[A] Federal court ought not impose its own views in 
such matters where there is a rational basis for the decisions and actions of the school authori-
ties" - once the school board has presented enough evidence to justify its decision, contradic-
tory testimony of student's experts is irrelevant.). 
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school board . . . first, since it is the school board that asserts the right 
to curtail presumptively protected activity, the board should bear the 
burden of establishing why; and second, the school board presumably 
has the essential information that led it to conclude that the activity had 
to be curtailed. 171 
This proposed procedure for review provides the best balance be-
tween a school's interest in efficient, orderly operation and the stu-
dent's first amendment rights. A school system may be less likely to 
abuse its power and more reluctant to challenge student expression in 
marginal cases if it knows it will face the task of justifying its regula-
tion before a court than if it thinks its decision will be final. When it 
does seek to restrain an article, the school may be more forthright and 
conciliatory toward the student whose expression is affected, in an ef-
fort to convince the student of the correctness of the decision and 
thereby avert a time-consuming and expensive court battle. This pro-
posed procedure will also encourage out-of-court agreements between 
administration and student, promoting the laudable sentiment of Eis=-
ner that "decisions with respect to the operation of local schools be 
made by local officials." 112 
Even with a system that allows prior restraint, if a student chooses 
to challenge a restraint, the path of litigation would not be signifi-
cantly more onerous than in the adult context. First, any restraint 
challenged in court would be limited, as in the adult setting, to "the 
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution,''173 a 
period which remains the same whichever party must appeal to the 
courts. Furthermore, the "protracted and onerous course of litiga-
tion"174 feared by the Supreme Court if an individual is forced to bring 
suit to vindicate her first amendment rights should not deter a student, 
since she knows that she can make out a prima facie case by showing 
the existence of a restraint. 175 Finally, the student incurs the same 
costs in defending her rights as if the burden of appeal were on the 
school; in either situation she must hire legal counsel. The balance of 
burdens in proceeding with a suit thus discourages both parties from 
engaging in frivolous litigation. 
The fact that a school board lacks a published review policy should 
not prohibit it from restraining student speech in the proper circum-
171. Shanley v. Northeastern Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972). 
172. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971). 
173. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). 
174. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). 
175. Any prior-submission regulation should clearly and explicitly inform the student of her 
right to appeal to the courts and the presumption in favor of permitting publication. Otherwise 
the school could create an illusion of finality by remaining silent about the appeals process, a 
finality which would indeed have a chilling effect. 
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stances. 176 The power to regulate is derived from the power to pre-
serve order, an authority which does not depend on the language of 
the regulations. Schools should not be encouraged to establish bur-
densome, constitutionally suspect review procedures merely on the 
chance that one of their students might write something disruptive or 
libelous;177 rather, the school's actions should be evaluated in light of 
the constitutional standard even if there is no written policy to guide 
the court. But because the absence of written standards increases the 
risk of post hoc rationalizations, courts should scrutinize the actions of 
school officials especially carefully in such cases. 11s 
Many student prior-submission rules are litigated only when a stu-
dent is disciplined for violating them. As a practical matter, students 
- and their parents - are more concerned about a suspension than 
about the suppression. If the rule is valid, then so is the punishment 
for violating it, 179 so long as due process is followed. But some courts 
have upheld discipline against violators without examining the validity 
of the underlying rule; 180 these cases pose serious constitutional 
problems. 
Most of the cases upholding discipline rely on the questionable 
premise that however invalid the restraint, the student commits an in-
dependent breach of the regulations by relying on self-help. "[T]he 
student has a legal way to test the validity of a school regulation and 
there is accordingly no reason for him to disregard the school regula-
tion or to flaunt [sic] school discipline." 181 The only permissible way 
to challenge a prior-submission rule, according to these courts, is to 
request permission to distribute, have it denied, and then appeal 
through the school system before turning to the courts - even if the 
student has a right to judicial review of the restraint in any case, re-
mains accountable for his deed, and may be punished if he is found to 
176. See Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (school authorities justified 
in seizing disruptive and libelous material despite having no written policies for review). 
177. "Indeed, it is arguable that, as a practical matter, expression is more likely to be inhib-
ited than encouraged if courts were to require schools to adopt regulations limiting speech." 
Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979). 
178. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
· 179. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (violation of time, place, 
and manner rules) (dictum); Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (distribution of 
literature adjudged substantially disruptive). 
180. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 n.11 (4th Cir. 1971) (dictum); Graham v. Houston lndep. 
School Dist., 335 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 
(E.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 384 n.5 (4th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J., 
sitting by designation); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1973); Hatter v. Los Angeles 
City High School Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 
10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Cintron v. State Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 
674, 681 (D.P.R. 1974). 
181. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 n.11 (1971). See also Graham v. Houston lndep. 
School Dist., 335 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 
(E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
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have violated a valid rule. This interpretation permits schools to erect 
a formidable wall of administrative obstacles to overcome before a stu-
dent can receive any independent review - in effect, a complete cen-
sorship for the duration of the prescribed procedures, no matter how 
unreasonable or unconstitutional they might be. This practical "chil-
ling effect" indicates that discipline should be permitted only when the 
challenge to the rule involves independently unprotected conduct, 182 
or when the rule is upheld as applied to the student's conduct. Sub-
stantive review of the regulation is needed to prevent school discipline 
for student expression from becoming a roundabout way to punish 
students for exercising their first amendment rights without exhaust-
ing administrative procedures. 
In short, regulations and restraints on the student press must give 
the student an opportunity for judicial review of the regulation. While 
the burden of filing suit is on the student, the school bears the burden 
of justifying its regulation. Any restrictions on student expression not 
based on a written policy are subject to closer scrutiny, but the consti-
tutional preference against any form of prior submission renders such 
restrictions palatable. School officials may discipline students for vio-
lating valid prior-submission rules, but may not impose sanctions on 
students for violating invalid rules or for any form of off-campus 
expression. 
CONCLUSION 
High school students do not enjoy the same first amendment pro-
tections as adults. However, the differences in protection may only be 
justified by the special circumstances of the school setting. The need 
to maintain order allows school' authorities to restrain material that 
disrupts the school. Concern for its own liability allows the school to 
restrain material that tortiously invades the rights of others so long as 
the school would be liable for the content of that material. Any ex-
pression not protected for adults is not protected for minors. Schools 
may also minimize disruption through reasonable, content-neutral reg-
ulations governing the time, place, and manner of distribution. 
Any regulation governing the prior submission of student material 
to school officials must clearly and precisely set out the criteria for 
182. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). In 
Sullivan, a student who had been suspended for disobeying an order to stop distributing an un-
derground newspaper visited campus several times during his suspension and repeatedly shouted 
profanity at the principal. By contrast, in Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973), the 
Ninth Circuit voided the suspension of a student for actions likely to cause substantial disruption 
because his actions did not violate any school rule, and in Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970), the Seventh Circuit invalidated a suspension based 
solely on distribution of an underground newspaper on school premises in violation of the 
school's prior-submission rule, where the rule was overbroad and the newspaper was protected 
expression. 
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restraint and should inform the student of his right to seek judicial 
review of any restrictions, a review in which the burden will be on the 
school to justify its restrictions. Given the constitutional bias against 
such restraints, the courts must strictly construe the regulations. The 
school system may not use its disciplinary authority to inhibit the pro-
tected expression of students: it may not punish students for failing to 
challenge the rules in the prescribed manner, unless their disobedience 
is independently disruptive, and it may not discipline students for any 
off-campus expression. 
